CSIS Report Excerpt
Excerpt from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070413_iraqfuture.pdf Cordesman’s CSIS report on the future of Iraq, “Iraq’s Troubled Future: The Uncertain Way Ahead”, revised April 13, pages 4-5 PDF document.
Under the heading, “The American Civil-Military Threat to Iraq”, Cordesman makes the following points (quoted verbatim or paraphrased):
1. The US invaded Iraq without a valid understanding of the Iraqi government, economy, and sectarian and ethnic differences. It did not have plans, staff, or aid money to deal with the situation; and did not have the force strength to provide security.
2. Our reaction to the problem was incompetent and misdirected. We focused on national elections and paper constitutions, rather than effective governance, and a massive aid program to “reconstruct” Iraq in American terms. It failed to recruit, deploy, and retain competent civilians.
3. It took too long to realize that creating effective Iraqi security forces was a critical element of stability. It rushed ill-prepared Iraqi Army units into combat and local security missions.
4. The US military was ill-prepared for its new focus on counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation building. Its military have been pushed into a wide range of new training and civil military roles. It remains short of experts and fully qualified translators (where it may still have less than 25% of its needs).
5.The US is only now is beginning to understand the full limits of Iraq’s oil “wealth,” the depth of the structural problems in Iraq’s economy, and the need to “reconstruct” in ways that take account of the need for money to flow to Iraqis, rather than foreign contractors.
6. Tactical victories and military efforts are pointless without political success. The US supported a form of deBaathification that was bound to alienate the Sunnis, and removed much of the nation’s secular core from power. The US insistence on national elections in a country without political parties left a legacy of government divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. The US pressure for a new constitution helped make “federalism” a key issue. Political conciliation has been far more cosmetic than real, adding Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite, Shi’ite on Shi’ite, and Arab on Kurd tension and violence to the threat posed by hard core Sunni Neo-Salafi led insurgency.
7. The “surge” strategy in Baghdad is little more than a repeat of previous tactical efforts to bring local security to the capital city. If it succeeds, it will probably be because the Shi’ite
militias stand down, and the US effectively helps a Shi’ite dominated government “win.” If it fails, it will probably be because US military friction with the Shi’ite militias becomes violent. It is far from clear that the US Congress will give either the current or the next President the necessary time and resources to exploit “success”, even if we achieve it.
8. As in Vietnam, the US has created reporting systems designed to report success, not real progress or the lack of it, for its Iraqi force development and political and economic aid efforts. This reporting has slowly improved in some areas under the pressure of events, but much of the US reporting on Iraqi force development and economic aid efforts still lacks meaning and credibility. This includes basic data like Iraqi force manpower, unit readiness, aid efforts relative to requirements, and reporting on aid based on meaningful measures of effectiveness.
