Arming Militias
The last two days bring us reports of the American military in Iraq starting to arm groups of Sunnis to fight other Sunni groups, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq. Such programs actually started some months ago in Anbar Province. Their success in Anbar has led to them being introduced in other highly contested provinces.
The American military claims that it will not give arms to any group that has fought against Americans. But this is nonsense. The main groups selected are largely made up of former Baath party members who have long campaigned against us. They have also been consistently opposed to the killing of Iraqis, particularly civilians. Aside from such ideological differences, it is possible that they have simply concluded that without American help they will eventually be wiped out. Some American commanders justify the approach because “nothing else has worked” (suggesting lack of faith in the “surge” on the ground).
Certainly, this initiative offers more possibility of “turning a corner” than anything else being tried. It is pointed out that the approach has numerous pitfalls, and it does. I have read that the extensive arms caches that sustained the insurgency for so long have just about been used up. Appearing to ally with the Americans could be a ploy that allows these groups to rearm before having another go at insurgency. There is also a strong chance that the American arms will be used against the Shi’a militias or the Iraqi government, two groups that many Sunnis see as practically identical.
Nevertheless, “arming the enemy” makes sense as a means of gradually extricating our forces from the mess. We have always thought of turning over the battle to Iraqi forces, by which we meant government forces. But the government forces have not measured up–military and police service seems to be mostly a job opportunity for the unemployed. Perhaps the Sunni militias are more dedicated. We have always worked with the Kurdish Pesh Murga militias, even bringing them to other parts of the country to fight with us.
We have not worked (at least publicly) with Shi’a militias, although we have been glad on occasion to see them fighting al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Perhaps it is time to consider such alliances, even with the Mahdi Army where appropriate. Except for the most hardened Islamists, no group in Iraq should be considered eternal enemies. We should sound out all armed groups, and see how we might work together. After all, in Afghanistan we supplied arms to for years to the forerunners of the Taliban in their struggle to drive out the Soviets. The Iranians are now helping to arm Shi’a militias in Iraq (although I do not necessarily accept some of the anti-Iranian propaganda in this regard). Is it not possible that these militias are accepting this assistance partially because no other supplier has stepped up? It is well known that even some of the militias linked to Iran do not want the Iranians to control the country. They would like a means of avoiding being beholden to this foreign power just as they do not want to be subservient to the United States.
All possibilities should be explored.
