Counterinsurgency and Airplanes

We hear once again of a “mistake” in Afghanistan. In the midst of a battle against the Taliban in an Afghan village, planes were called in. They destroyed the target. Unfortunately, there were children in the target. This has happened again and again in Afghanistan. It happens frequently in Iraq. The American or NATO troops are few in relation to the size of the country and the dimensions of the insurgencies. Air power is one way in which our side is clearly superior. When our forces are pinned down, there is an irresistible impulse to follow conventional battlefield doctrine and bring in the planes for close ground support. Battles are won.

Yet the local people have long memories, and even those who were not against us before, may now take up arms to avenge their new enemies who come by air.

My advice would be to simply exclude the use of air power to support troops in populated areas. I realize that in the short run, this would be counterproductive. It would be like tying the hands of the troops behind their backs. Yet in the long run, in winning the support of the people without which there is no victory in these contests, it might pay off. At least it should be looked into.

I realize that there would still be unwanted civilian casualties. But I believe they would be greatly reduced. The soldiers on the ground would be much more able to react to signs that the targets were not what they thought they were.

It is argued that al-Qaeda and Taliban deliberately mix civilians in with their militias, sometimes using compulsion. We cannot avoid this. But we can strive harder to avoid falling into the moral traps they set.

Arming Militias

The last two days bring us reports of the American military in Iraq starting to arm groups of Sunnis to fight other Sunni groups, particularly al-Qaeda in Iraq. Such programs actually started some months ago in Anbar Province. Their success in Anbar has led to them being introduced in other highly contested provinces.

The American military claims that it will not give arms to any group that has fought against Americans. But this is nonsense. The main groups selected are largely made up of former Baath party members who have long campaigned against us. They have also been consistently opposed to the killing of Iraqis, particularly civilians. Aside from such ideological differences, it is possible that they have simply concluded that without American help they will eventually be wiped out. Some American commanders justify the approach because “nothing else has worked” (suggesting lack of faith in the “surge” on the ground).

Certainly, this initiative offers more possibility of “turning a corner” than anything else being tried. It is pointed out that the approach has numerous pitfalls, and it does. I have read that the extensive arms caches that sustained the insurgency for so long have just about been used up.  Appearing to ally with the Americans could be a ploy that allows these groups to rearm before having another go at insurgency. There is also a strong chance that the American arms will be used against the Shi’a militias or the Iraqi government, two groups that many Sunnis see as practically identical.

Nevertheless, “arming the enemy” makes sense as a means of gradually extricating our forces from the mess. We have always thought of turning over the battle to Iraqi forces, by which we meant government forces. But the government forces have not measured up–military and police service seems to be mostly a job opportunity for the unemployed. Perhaps the Sunni militias are more dedicated. We have always worked with the Kurdish Pesh Murga militias, even bringing them to other parts of the country to fight with us.

We have not worked (at least publicly) with Shi’a militias, although we have been glad on occasion to see them fighting al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army. Perhaps it is time to consider such alliances, even with the Mahdi Army where appropriate. Except  for the most hardened Islamists, no group in Iraq should be considered eternal enemies. We should sound out all armed groups, and see how we might work together. After all, in Afghanistan we supplied arms to for years to the forerunners of the Taliban in their struggle to drive out the Soviets. The Iranians are now helping to arm Shi’a militias in Iraq (although I do not necessarily accept some of the anti-Iranian propaganda in this regard). Is it not possible that these militias are accepting this assistance partially because no other supplier has stepped up? It is well known that even some of the militias linked to Iran do not want the Iranians to control the country. They would like a means of avoiding being beholden to this foreign power just as they do not want to be subservient to the United States.

All possibilities should be explored.

Iraq: Where Are We?

Despair continues to be the most popular response to the Iraq War. The latest accounting (June 10) for where we are by a reliable Brookings Institute team that has been offering a summary regularly in the New York Times finds a few bright spots, especially in Baghdad and Anbar province. Yet it points out that overall levels of violence remain very high and the political and economic systems show little if any sign of progress.  Among the utilities, only the increase in telephone subscribers shows steady growth, something that has been sustained since 2003. Other reports, as we have noted, point to the continual drain of the best and the brightest. One survey of university graduates (they do still have them) reports that nearly all of them intend to get out of the country as fast as they can.

But one cannot help but admire the courage (or stubbornness) of the thousands of teachers and doctors that continue to do their jobs as best they can.

The papers have been full of discussions lately of where we go from here. The Republican candidates, other than McCain, do not want to even mention Iraq. The Democratic candidates clearly have little to offer. They differ mostly on how stridently they demand we get out now, and how much equivocation they can sneak in under the cover of stridency. The U.S. military appears to believe that we are going to have a permanent presence for a long time. The analogy being accepted by some now is Korea, where we have remained since the fifties. The position of the leading Iraqis is not too different from the Democrats: “out (but)”.

Blood in the Sand

The more we learn about Iraq, the less we seem to know. Americans try to get between the killers and their prey while many Iraqis want to kill Americans so that they can go back to killing one another. Of course, all Iraqis are not like this. But many of those who are not are long gone from the country, leaving behind an ever more warped populace.

In Sunday’s NYT “Week in Review” section, the reporter Edward Wong tells us that Iraqis have long been famous in the region for desiring a particular outcome in their conflicts, an outcome that is described by the word “sahel”. Sahel means the absolute destruction of opponents, followed by the complete destruction and humiliation of their bodies. The hanging of Americans in Falluja was by no means a fluke. It was SOP.

Wong’s conversations with Iraqis suggest that many feel this way about their enemies. They do not intend to rest until they have completely destroyed them. Even if they belong to a minority like the Sunnis, they feel that their honor demands that they strive persistently and unwaveringly toward destroying their foes. The Sunnis are convinced that they are meant to rule, and the Shi’a are trash from which the country must be cleansed. The Shi’as see themselves as humiliated and violated for centuries. It is past time for them to wreak their vengeance. Both groups see Kurds as unimportant people meant to be ruled. The Kurds, on the other hand, have their own grievances and unsatisfiable aspirations.

In this context, the American hope that the factions will tire of the conflict seems unlikely to be realized. All sides see death as strengthening their cause, either the death of their own or of the enemy. And the more horrible the deaths on either side, the more they fire the desires, self-righteousness and hatred of those still alive.

We should add to this the general Iraqi view that Americans are weak and unreliable. They are unreliable because they do not have the depth of feeling of the Iraqis. Whatever schedule we might have for leaving, we will leave, so many Iraqis feel they can just wait us out. But the last few days suggest that they are not willing to wait bloodlessly. They want to kill us to encourage our departure, but also because they just like to kill whomever they have defined as the enemy. And they want to kill one another to position themselves for the real struggle that will follow.

One should add that the Shi’a mistrust the coalition because outsiders have always abandoned them, and they see our real allegiance to be to the Sunni countries of the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The Sunnis mistrust us because our supposed dedication to “democracy” produces a system that favors the Shi’a. Neither side has any concept of sharing or compromise. The Kurds mistrust us because we have repeatedly abandoned them after encouraging their efforts, and because they feel our stronger tie is to the Turks in NATO who want nothing to do with an independent Kurdistan.

(In making this summary of Wong, I am leaving aside the much more complex texture of the society in which hatreds and killings often reflect, and reflect intensely, animosities that exist within each of the broad groupings with which we must deal.)

Wong’s analysis does not provide the analytical basis with which analysts generally like to approach conflict. But the continued inability of American forces to reduce the killing of either Iraqis or Americans in the current “surge” must be confounding to the generals. This inability cries out for an analysis that admits we are lost in the bloody sand and don’t know what to do next. Ultimately, the key failure in Iraq has more to do with being there at all and less with failures of strategy, tactics, equipment, or an inadequate number of boots on the ground.

CSIS Report (Continued)

What has inspired me to devote so much of this blog to the CSIS Report is its ability to both understand the foolishness and error in the whole enterprise, and at the same time come to a conclusion that we should stay and help rebuild Iraq no matter what. As the bodies pile up in Baghdad, I do not know if I fully agree. But it lays out a case that cannot be dismissed. It is a moral case: we must live up to our responsibilities. Yet I wonder if it is a practical case: is there anything we can actually do militarily? Of course, “once things settle down”, we can assist refugees and assist rebuilding. But we could do that anyhow if we removed the troops tomorrow.

The full report spends a great deal of time considering public opinion polls in Iraq and how the Iraqi answers have changed over the years. In many ways, these polls provide a better view of the true dimensions of the tragedy than daily news reports. By 2007 only 26% of Iraqis felt safe in their neighborhoods, only 16% in Baghdad. In 2004 only 17% found it acceptable to attack U.S. forces, but 51% find it acceptable today, including nearly all Sunnis. Americans are seen as the leading cause of violence, particularly because of Coalition attacks on civilians. Yet with all this, most Iraqis do not want the Coalition forces out “just now”. Most hate us, but evidently fear what would happen without us.

The report mentions many wars: Shi’a versus Shi’a in the south, Shi’a versus Sunni, especially in Baghdad. Al Qaeda versus everyone else. Coalition forces versus everyone except for the Kurds. Kurds versus everyone else except for the Coalition. To this we should add special wars, such as the struggle for Mosul in the north in which the Sunnis seem to be driving out the Kurds, and that in Kirkuk in which the Kurds seem to be driving out non-Kurds.

The report concludes that it is Iraqi plans and Iraqi time tables that count now. We have become increasingly marginalized. The most important task for the Iraqis is creating an acceptable law dividing up the oil resource. Solving this problem “could easily take until 2009″. In any event, we must be prepared for the long haul with or without troop withdrawal.

CSIS Report Excerpt

Excerpt from http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/070413_iraqfuture.pdf Cordesman’s CSIS report on the future of Iraq, “Iraq’s Troubled Future: The Uncertain Way Ahead”, revised April 13, pages 4-5 PDF document.

Under the heading, “The American Civil-Military Threat to Iraq”, Cordesman makes the following points (quoted verbatim or paraphrased):

1. The US invaded Iraq without a valid understanding of the Iraqi government, economy, and sectarian and ethnic differences. It did not have plans, staff, or aid money to deal with the situation; and did not have the force strength to provide security.

2. Our reaction to the problem was incompetent and misdirected. We focused on national elections and paper constitutions, rather than effective governance, and a massive aid program to “reconstruct” Iraq in American terms. It failed to recruit, deploy, and retain competent civilians.

3. It took too long to realize that creating effective Iraqi security forces was a critical element of stability. It rushed ill-prepared Iraqi Army units into combat and local security missions.

4. The US military was ill-prepared for its new focus on counterinsurgency, stability operations, and nation building. Its military have been pushed into a wide range of new training and civil military roles. It remains short of experts and fully qualified translators (where it may still have less than 25% of its needs).

5.The US is only now is beginning to understand the full limits of Iraq’s oil “wealth,” the depth of the structural problems in Iraq’s economy, and the need to “reconstruct” in ways that take account of the need for money to flow to Iraqis, rather than foreign contractors.

6. Tactical victories and military efforts are pointless without political success. The US supported a form of deBaathification that was bound to alienate the Sunnis, and removed much of the nation’s secular core from power. The US insistence on national elections in a country without political parties left a legacy of government divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. The US pressure for a new constitution helped make “federalism” a key issue. Political conciliation has been far more cosmetic than real, adding Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite, Shi’ite on Shi’ite, and Arab on Kurd tension and violence to the threat posed by hard core Sunni Neo-Salafi led insurgency.

7. The “surge” strategy in Baghdad is little more than a repeat of previous tactical efforts to bring local security to the capital city. If it succeeds, it will probably be because the Shi’ite
militias stand down, and the US effectively helps a Shi’ite dominated government “win.” If it fails, it will probably be because US military friction with the Shi’ite militias becomes violent. It is far from clear that the US Congress will give either the current or the next President the necessary time and resources to exploit “success”, even if we achieve it.

8. As in Vietnam, the US has created reporting systems designed to report success, not real progress or the lack of it, for its Iraqi force development and political and economic aid efforts. This reporting has slowly improved in some areas under the pressure of events, but much of the US reporting on Iraqi force development and economic aid efforts still lacks meaning and credibility. This includes basic data like Iraqi force manpower, unit readiness, aid efforts relative to requirements, and reporting on aid based on meaningful measures of effectiveness.

American Irrresponsibility

In Sunday’s New York Times Magazine, Nir Rosen had an excellent piece on Iraqi refugees. There are now about two million outside the country, nearly all in the Middle East, and nearly as many displaced persons still within the country. The largest number is in Syria, and here the refugees have found the most welcoming situation. Syria is the only major state that welcomes Shiites, and it is the only state that has managed to reduce hostilities among competing groups from Iraq. It does this by trying to remain friendly to all, and by strongly discouraging any talk of sectarianism (a stance that also fits its internal balance of power requirements).

There are fascinating glimpses of the approaches of the factional leaders now in Syria. Originally, they saw the enemy as the Americans. But over time this has been changing. Now their most intransigent enemies are the al-Qaeda and Jihadist groups who have no real interest in Iraq or Iraqis. They distinguish sharply between the “honorable struggle” that targets only foreigners and the al-Qaeda approach that targets civilians as well. They are also coming to see the Iranians as a common enemy of Iraq. (It must be said that most of the conversations are with Sunnis). They also see Iraq under Hussein as being essentially non-sectarian, pointing out that the coup attempts against Hussein were almost entirely by Sunnis.

But the most discouraging section of the piece is that on the American response. We have done almost nothing for the refugees and do not intend to. Our position is that of Bolton, former ambassador to the UN. He told the author that Americans have no responsibility for the refugee problem “Our obligation was to give them new institutions and provide security. We have fulfilled that obligation.”  Another high-ranking official in the Bush State Department agreed, pointing out that “Refugees are created by repressive regimes — the refugee problem was caused by Saddam Hussein”. Thus, when we got rid of him, we had essentially “solved” the refugee problem.

It would seem as though many in this administration live in an alternate universe. There is no recognition that the chaos has been caused by faulty decisions, no matter how well intentioned they might have been. We have produced a mess from which the Iraqis flee. Of course, they are partly responsible, but the world believes and I believe that we are also responsible — for ending the war and for what it has produced.

Defending Honor, Distrusting Charity

Two news items in the last few days have a deep psychological connection. The first tells of a Dutch force in Afghanistan in one of its most dangerous provinces that is trying to win the struggle with the Taliban by concentrating almost entirely on reconstruction projects. They are armed men, but their strategy is to use arms only when attacked, and to pull back out of a fight if possible. This way the people will see that they are positively affecting their lives and not negatively. Once they begin to trust the Dutch, they will get rid of the Taliban themselves. But today we read of a Dutch patrol nearly getting wiped out in an ambush. They are told that everyone in the village is with the Taliban.

The next item is a description of a huge Shi’a rally in Najaf demanding that the Americans get out of Iraq. Never mind that the Americans toppled their oppressor and set up a democratic system that will allow the Shi’a to rule Iraq. They want them out and now.

Why?

Two reasons come to mind. First, the people of Afghanistan and Iraq feel dishonored by having their country occupied by foreign troops. (To them, it seems like an occupation.) The fact that they have to live with the situation is unbearable, no matter what its advantages. Second, most people, and especially people in the developing world, simply do not believe in the goodness and well-meaning of others. Whatever they say or do, the Afghans are not going to be taken in. These Dutch have something to gain that we will eventually learn to our sorrow. We just haven’t figured what it is yet. The Iraqis are even more sure that the Americans are up to no good. “They say they are here to project us. But who are they kidding? They are here to rob our oil or take away our religion or turn the country over to the Sunnis (Shi’a belief) or over to the Shi’a (Sunni belief).”

These are the realities. Outsiders can sometimes overcome them, but don’t bank on it.

Short Blog Vacation

Because of other commitments, the reader should not expect additional posts to this blog for the next two weeks.

American Strategy in Iraq

Juan Cole reprints in his blog the opinion of Professor Kahl of Minnesota on the apparent counterinsurgency strategies of the United States since the beginning of the Iraq war. Let me summarize briefly Professor Kahl’s points. He divides the COIN operations into four phases.

Phase 1: Denial. Until April 2004, there was a general denial that an insurgency existed. The result was that the different commanders were pretty much on their own. Some concentrated on providing the population with protection, while others conducted aggressive search and destroy operations. This phase ended with the Fallujah uprising and the revolt of Moqtada al-Sadr.

Phase 2: Learning Curve. The military woke up to a problem and began developing new strategies and tactics. It took more seriously training Iraqi forces. Yet the bulk of the effort still went in to alienating search and destroy efforts. Only in early 2005, did the leaders begin to systematically learn from their mistakes.

Phase 3: Getting it. The military now began a number of experiments, especially in Tal Afar and Ramadi to place the emphasis on the protection of the people. This effort was, however, compromised by two other factors. First, the military had begun in 2004 to consolidate its basing by closing many of its smaller bases in the countryside. The was a natural development of the idea that we needed to reduce the Iraqi perception that their country was under occupation. But it also meant that the forces were less able to implement the people protection mission. The other problem was that we simply did not have enough forces for the hold strategy. We attempted to fill the gap with Iraqis. But this effort took more time than had been imagined.

Phase 4: Doing it. In January 2006, Bush announced a new strategy that would make possible the achievements foreseen in Phase 3. We would bring in more troops and we would assign more to population protection. Kahl notes that this was not actually a new strategy. The strategy had been created in Phase 3. But it was an effort to provide additional forces that might make the “clear, hold, and build” option actually work. But as Kahl further notes, this might be too little and too late.